ÿþ<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd"> <html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><head> <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8" /><title>UC San Diego Department of Economics :: Martin Tobal</title><!-- All links in the head will need to be site root relative, so they may need to be rewritten before being deployed --> <link href="styles/undohtml.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" media="screen" /><!-- Eliminate inconsistent browser styling, reset sizes --> <link href="styles/personalPages.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" media="screen" /><!-- Page specific styles --> <link href="styles/print.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" media="print" /><!-- Print styles --></head> <body> <div id="wrapper"> <div id="banner"><!-- All banner text will normally be hidden with styles --> <h1>UC San Diego</h1> <h2><a href="http://economics.ucsd.edu">Economics</a></h2> </div> <div id="content"> <div id="personalInfo"> <div id="vitals"> <h1 id="name"> Martin Tobal </h1> <h2 id="title">Graduate student  Department of Economics</h2> <ul class="navList"> <li class="first"><a href="index.html">Home</a></li> <li><a href="cvs/cvs.pdf">Curriculum Vitae</a></li> <li><a href="workingpapers.html">Research</a></li> <li><a href="teaching.html">Teaching</a></li> </ul> <div id="contactSummary"> <p><span class="label">Phone:&nbsp;</span>(619) 822-4340</p> <p><span class="label">Email:</span> <a href="mailto:mtobal@ucsd.edu">mtobal@ucsd.edu</a></p> </div> <!-- END CONTACT --> </div> <!-- END VITALS --> <div id="moreInfo"><!--This is the section for all content apart from the vital info above. Wrap individual sections in div tags with a class of either subsection or subsectionNarrow. Use h2 tags for the title of the section --> <div class="subsection"> <h2>Research Summary</h2> <br /> <p>A one-page overview of my research.</p> <br /> <p><span class="label"><a href="cvs/s.pdf">Research Summary</a></p> </div> <div class="subsection"> <h2>Working Papers</h2> <br /> <p><span style="font-weight: bold;"> A Model Of Employment And Wage Impacts Of Service Offshoring [Job Market Paper 1].</span> &nbsp;&nbsp; <a href="cvs/tradeisgood.pdf">PDF</a></p> <p>Abstract: I develop a two-sector model of trade in final goods and intermediate tasks (services). Goods differ in skill-intensity and tasks differ in tradability. A country with high final goods productivity and abundant skilled labor relative to the rest of the world is shown to have incentives to import (offshore) both skilled and unskilled tasks that are greater for the latter. Consequently, given identical tradability schedules, more unskilled than skilled tasks are imported in equilibrium. With putty-clay technology for tasks that locks workers into occupations in the short run but allows retraining in the long run, transition from the non-offshoring to the offshoring equilibrium yields employment and real wage effects in line with the young empirical literature on service offshoring: both effects increase from negative to positive as tradeability declines, with the switches from negative to positive occurring at a higher level of tradeability for skilled than unskilled tasks. More productive countries will have more losers because they offshore more tasks.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </p> <p><span style="font-weight: bold;"> Entry Barriers, Rent-Shifting, And The Home Market Effect [Job Market Paper 2]. </span> &nbsp;&nbsp; <a href="cvs/a.pdf">PDF</a></p> <p>Abstract: I introduce entry barriers into an otherwise standard model of the home market effect. Entry barriers cause market sizes to become endogenous by creating rents. I prove that the endogeneity of market size has four implications. First, endogenous market size magnifies the standard home-market effect. Second, it is no longer true that both countries benefit unambiguously from mutual trade liberalization. In particular, if rents are sufficiently large and country sizes are sufficiently unequal, a trade agreement will reduce welfare in the smaller country. Third, an increase in entry barriers increases the market size of the larger country. Despite the reduction in product variety, welfare in the larger country may actually increase. Fourth, governments can use trade policy to shift foreign rents to their countries and enlarge their home markets, generating a greater incentive for "beggar-thy-neighbor" trade policies than in the standard model.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </p> <p></p> </div> <div class="subsection"> <h2>Work in Progress<br /> </h2> <br /> <p><span style="font-weight: bold;">Development Strategies And International Outsourcing</span> &nbsp;</p> <p> Abstract: This paper investigates governments incentives to use trade-protection as a device for developing non-comparative advantage sectors. Trade protection creates beneficial industrial linkages but reallocates production away from comparative advantage industries. The industrial linkages increase the rents of the home country at the expense of foreign countries. Therefore, developing countries have a rent-shifting motivation for setting high tariffs. In countries with a relatively low comparative disadvantage, this rent-shifting motivation is stronger than the gains from specialization. Consequently, these countries will protect their research-intensive sectors and capture the rents associated with these industries. In deriving these results, this paper relates Pol Antras seminal work on international outsourcing to the industrial development of East Asian countries. Specifically, the paper connects Antras work to the strategies followed by Taiwan and South-Korea in reducing the technological gap with respect to developed countries.</p> </div> </div> </div> </div> <!-- End content --> <div id="footer"> <p id="footerContactLink"><a href="http://economics.ucsd.edu/about/contact.php">Contact Us</a></p> <img style="width: 180px; height: 30px;" src="images/footerLogo.gif" alt="University of California, San Diego logo" /> <p>Official Web site of the University of California, San Diego<br /> University of California, San Diego, 9500 Gilman Dr., La Jolla, CA 92093<br /> (858) 534-2230<br /> Copyright 2008 Regents of the University. All rights reserved.</p> <p><a href="http://www.ucsd.edu/portal/site/ucsd/menuitem.135225ab0c7ce3c0c0020010d34b01ca/?vgnextoid=640116e2ac286110VgnVCM10000064b410acRCRD">Terms and Conditions of Use</a></p> </div> <!-- End footer --> </div> <!-- End wrapper --><!-- End footer include --> </body></html>